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Silencing the Noise: Asbestos liabilities, accounting and strategic 
bankruptcy 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The legacy of the global exploitation of asbestos provides an illustrative case to examine 
corporate strategy in response to the significant financial risk presented by the long-tail liability. 
The James Hardie group was the dominant asbestos manufacturing concern in Australia and, 
confronted with the uncertainties of burgeoning long-tail tort claims, embarked on a radical 
corporate reorganization. At the centre of the reorganization was the creation of a business unit of 
limited potential to separate asbestos long-tail liabilities from the profitable operations of the 
corporate group and locate the risk in an alternate legal arena. The strategic recognition of 
accounting assets and liabilities to construct a ‘bottom line’ and shift organizational boundaries is 
explored using Delaney’s theory of strategic bankruptcy. This interdisciplinary and critical 
sociological lens highlights the power of organizations to exploit the malleability of accounting 
concepts to pursue their strategic goals.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the hallmarks of the industrial exploitation of asbestos has been the complex corporate 
maneuvering to attenuate the financial liabilities that arise from compensation claims for 
asbestos-related disease. Two notable examples in advanced legal regimes, the Manville case in 
the US (Delaney, 1992) and Turner & Newall in the UK (McCulloch and Tweedale, 2008; 
Tweedale, 2000) have demonstrated the power of organizations to exploit their regulatory context 
to control litigation claims, potentially casting asbestos victims adrift. The purpose of this paper 
is to demonstrate how the management of James Hardie Industries Limited (James Hardie) 
engaged legal frameworks to avoid legal and moral obligations arising from asbestos operations 
in Australia. In a global environment, this paper contributes to our understanding of corporate 
reorganizations in jurisdictionally-bound legal regimes and highlights the tensions that exist 
between the desire for accounting to be standardized internationally and the malleability of 
accounting concepts in national contexts. This paradox is played out in practices such as transfer 
pricing, taxation and tax havens, general insolvency and also accounting for long-tail liabilities 
arising from exposure to toxic products. 
 
Apart from tobacco, few mass-produced substances have proven as toxic to humans as asbestos. 
As a mineral renowned for its strength, flexibility and fire resistant qualities, it is still used 
extensively as an insulator and building material, despite a ban on its use or import in many 
countries (Moerman and van der Laan, 2013a). While the health risks associated with industrial 
and occupational exposure through the extraction, fabrication and use of asbestos have been 
documented and studied throughout the 20th century1, it was not until 1973 that a landmark US 
case highlighted the dangers to the general public from even trivial environmental exposure 
(Castleman, 1979). Previously confined to the domain of workers’ compensation, this case 
expanded the reach of compensation claims for asbestos-related disease2 into the arena of tort 
law. Given asbestos-related disease can manifest decades after exposure; this long latency period 
presents difficulties in ascertaining both the quantum and timing of tortious claims. 
Consequently, companies involved in the asbestos industry present a unique opportunity to 
examine strategic responses to the financial threat of long-tail tort liabilities3 in the interstitial 
space where notions of stakeholder power, accounting representations, and the conceptual artifact 
of the corporate entity coalesce. This paper adopts a critical sociological approach from 
Delaney’s theory of strategic bankruptcy to explore key aspects of the reorganization of the 
multinational and former Australian asbestos manufacturer, James Hardie. 
  
While James Hardie currently produces a wide range of non-asbestos products globally, the story 
was quite different prior to the 1980s. As an Australian manufacturing conglomerate all James 
Hardie products contained asbestos and, as the Chairman, John Reid boasted in 1977; 
every time you walk into an office building, a home, a factory; every time 
you put your foot on the brake, ride in a train, see a bulldozer at 
work…the chances are that a product from the James Hardie group of 
companies has a part in it (in Peacock, 2009, p. 137)   
 
The ubiquitous use of James Hardie asbestos products resulted in a growing financial legacy from 
occupational and environmental exposure which continued to plague the corporate group. In an 
effort to “eliminate legacy issues that would otherwise continue to detract from value creation”, 
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James Hardie embarked on ‘Project Green’ in 2001, a radical corporate restructure as a 
“comprehensive solution” (JHIL, 2001a, p. 1). This strategy involved creating a separate special 
purpose entity to fund current and future liabilities arising from asbestos litigation claims which 
threatened the availability of adequate funds to compensate a vulnerable group of stakeholders 
for asbestos-related disease. Burying ‘toxic’ balance sheet items in special purpose entities is not 
an unusual practice (see for example the high-profile cases of Enron in the US and Parmalat in 
Europe). However, this case differs in that, to enable the separation of the asbestos legacy from 
its core operating activities, James Hardie needed to make visible (albeit in a controlled manner) 
asbestos liabilities. In this case previously ‘known’ but incalculable future liabilities were 
rendered, seemingly overnight, calculable and consequently manageable. A strategic approach to 
bankruptcy, such as that offered by Delaney (1989, 1992), generates questions about 
management’s power to shift organizational boundaries, their ability to determine when long-tail 
asbestos contingencies become official liabilities; as well as the organizational power embedded 
in social relationships to enable the construction an organizational ‘bottom line’ (Eckstein and 
Delaney, 1993). 
  
According to Delaney (1989, 1992), management facing uncertainty from long-tail tort litigation 
may pursue a strategy to move into a legal arena that provides greater certainty and affords more 
control. The arena of corporate law provides the framework to shift organizational boundaries 
and create a business unit of limited potential by exploiting the technical relationship between 
assets and liabilities (Delaney, 1989, 1994). However, corporate reorganizations are enacted in a 
unique historical, regulatory and socio-political context (Eckstein and Delaney, 1993) where 
options are limited and contingent upon the perceived relative power of adversaries to interfere in 
strategic actions (Delaney, 1994) – considered by James Hardie management as ‘stakeholder 
noise’. To explore the network of resources and constraints, we draw on prior research examining 
the James Hardie case. These accounts have considered: legal aspects (Dunn, 2005; Jackson, 
2004; Prince et al 2004; Spender, 2003; 2005); societal and ethical implications (Gunz and van 
der Laan, 2011; Haigh, 2006; Peacock, 2009); management communications (Moerman and van 
der Laan, 2007; Moerman and van der Laan, 2011); and, the management of long-tail risk 
(Moerman and van der Laan, 2012). This paper differs from previous accounts by offering an 
approach that exposes accounting as a pivotal element in one of the most important events in 
Australian corporate history. 
 
Organizational strategies explored from a critical sociological perspective challenge the 
presumption that accounting is a mere tool for economic decision-making providing the means to 
make economically rational decisions in an organizational context. Indeed, accounting has been 
portrayed as a tool of domination and oppression in a variety of contexts including slavery (see 
Fleischman and Tyson, 2004); the Holocaust (see Funnell, 1998); race and ethnicity (see Greer 
and Neu, 2009); and workers’ rights (see Tinker, 1985) among others. Adopting a similar stance, 
this paper demonstrates how accounting concepts can be used as a hegemonic resource to 
recognize liabilities and construct a ‘bottom line’, counterintuitive to mainstream assumptions of 
corporate management behavior (Delaney, 1989; 1992; 1994). 
 
The paper begins with a description of the reorganization strategy of James Hardie. This is 
followed by a discussion of the challenges of interdisciplinary research and an outline of how the 
organizational goal of quarantining asbestos liabilities was facilitated through the strategic use of 
accounting concepts. A review of the institutions and networks considered to contribute to 
stakeholder noise leads to the conclusion that, despite jurisdictional nuances, James Hardie’s 
management were able to pursue a strategy consistent with strategic bankruptcy.  
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2. JAMES HARDIE AND ASBESTOS LIABILITIES 
 
Asbestos has been mined since prehistoric times and anecdotal knowledge of the risks to health 
from asbestos exposure has been observed since the time of Ancient Greece (Castleman, 1979).   
Asbestos-related diseases4 can be progressive and fatal and the cancer, mesothelioma, can 
manifest many decades after even tangential or incidental exposure. Therefore, claims for disease 
attributable to both occupational and environmental exposure are expected to continue well into 
the future as asbestos remains prevalent in the industrial and built environment and continues to 
be mined and manufactured in certain, particularly developing, countries (Virta, 2010). Asbestos 
remains a global issue and cases such as: Turner & Newall in the UK; Manville in the US; Cape 
Asbestos in South Africa; and, Eternit in Europe continue to present challenges for legislators, 
corporations and society.  
 
In Australia the use of asbestos was widespread, particularly in the mid-1950s and through to the 
1960s in a booming post-war housing market looking for a durable, heat resistant and easily 
transportable building product (Haigh, 2006). During this period 52% of the homes in the state of 
New South Wales (NSW)5 were constructed using asbestos-fibre cement or ‘fibro’ (Safe Work 
Australia, 2009). In Australia, mesothelioma is a notifiable disease (since 1982) and the number 
of new cases diagnosed has risen dramatically (Safe Work Australia, 2009). Despite the ban on 
the use and import of asbestos in 2003, a ‘new generation’ of litigants is emerging from the 
incidental exposure to asbestos during the renovation of homes and buildings and environmental 
asbestos remediation (DEEWR, 2012). Asbestos products were manufactured by subsidiaries of 
the parent company, James Hardie Industries Limited (JHIL). In particular, James Hardie and 
Coy (Coy6) produced building and construction products and Jsekarb Pty Ltd (Jsekarb7) 
manufactured brake linings (Prince et al., 2004). And while James Hardie is not alone in facing 
asbestos-related compensation claims in Australia, it faces significant liability due to the range of 
products manufactured and their dominance in the Australian market.  
 
James Hardie had previously attempted reorganization and listing on the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE). However, this listing required the disclosure of asbestos liabilities in 
accordance with US generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) for a US Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) 20-F filing8. Importantly, Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards No. 5 (FAS 5), Accounting for Contingencies, mandated the disclosure of 
undiscounted contingent liabilities for all companies in a group. The listing did not proceed 
reportedly due to a lack of interest in the initial public offering (Grant Samuel and Associates Pty 
Limited, 2001; Spender, 2003). While various reasons were mooted, James Hardie management 
decided that any further attempts at a listing in the US necessitated the deconsolidation of 
asbestos liabilities from the profitable operating businesses (JHIL, 2001a) (see Figure 1 below for 
a simplified representation of the corporate structure prior to Project Green).  
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In February 2001, the two stages of Project Green commenced. The first, to isolate the former 
asbestos subsidiaries Coy and Jsekarb was completed by transferring these subsidiaries to the 
Medical Research and Compensation Foundation (MRCF), as a special purpose entity to fund 
both current and future asbestos-related claims.  
 
However, despite jettisoning Coy and Jsekarb, a residual risk of asbestos-related litigation claims 
remained with the parent company, JHIL9. Additionally, by 2001 the US market for James 
Hardie building products was booming generating 80-90% of the group’s profits and, according 
to management, shareholder tax inefficiencies arising from profit repatriation to Australia was 
eroding shareholder value (JHIL, 2001a). To take advantage of the more favorable tax treatment 
afforded under the US–Netherlands Tax Treaty (Grant Samuel and Associates Pty Limited, 
2001), the James Hardie parent company was transferred to the Netherlands following approval 
from both shareholders and the NSW Supreme Court. In a scrip-for-scrip swap10, the 
shareholders of JHIL became the shareholders of a newly created parent entity domiciled in the 
Netherlands, JHI NV, rendering JHIL a wholly owned subsidiary of this new parent company and 
further distancing current operations from the legacy of the former asbestos operations.  
 
The new Dutch parent (JHI NV) purchased the current Australian non-asbestos operating 
subsidiaries from JHIL in exchange for callable partly-paid shares ($1.96 billion outstanding) to 
meet any future asbestos claims against JHIL11. The partly-paid shares were subsequently 
cancelled in March 200312 and were substituted by a Deed of Covenant, Indemnity and Access13. 
This potential ‘life-line’ of funds for claimants against the former asbestos subsidiaries of the 
Group was now severed and the maneuvering achieved complete legal separation. Later that year, 
JHIL14 was transferred to a new entity the ABN 60 Foundation (see Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2 below demonstrates the key features of the outcome of reorganization of James Hardie. 
The former asbestos manufacturing and operating subsidiaries, Coy and Jsekarb, as well as the 
former parent company, JHIL, were completely isolated from future operating profits. By 2003, 
without other intervention, the only legal recourse for asbestos claimants was through the MRCF.  
James Hardie Industries Ltd (JHIL) 
 
James Hardie NV 
(JHNV) 
 
James Hardie & Coy 
(now Amaca) 
Building Products 
Jsekarb Pty Ltd 
(now Amaba) 
Brake products 
James Hardie and 
Co. (NZ) 
Figure 1: James Hardie group structure (excerpt) prior to Project Green reorganization 
strategy with former asbestos subsidiaries and parent highlighted (Adapted from: Jackson,  
2004) 
James Hardie Australia 
(JHA) 
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The MRCF was created under the rules of incorporation as a ‘fully funded’ special purpose entity 
and legitimated by the “technical economic relation between assets and liabilities” (Delaney, 
1989, p.663). However, skepticism and suspicion surrounded the financial adequacy of the 
MRCF to satisfy future claims (Spender, 2003) and, following considerable public outcry, a 
governmental Special Commission of Inquiry (Jackson Inquiry) was established to investigate the 
ability of the MRCF to manage its long-tail liabilities. 
  
This paper focuses on the creation of the MRCF as integral to the success of the Project Green 
strategy. Delaney (1994, p.501) argues that “business bankruptcy provides a unique opportunity 
to assess how business executives and auditors arrive at the bottom line” as private company 
records generally not afforded to researchers become available. In addition, during legal 
proceedings, confidential documents are subpoenaed; experts are questioned about models and 
assumptions that formed opinions and calculations and the usually private space of the corporate 
boardroom is open to public gaze (Delaney, 1994). Similarly, the Jackson Inquiry made use of 
subpoenaed internal James Hardie documents including confidential material comprising minutes 
of board meetings; confidential board papers; email correspondence and documents containing 
legal advice; witness evidence from key actors such as the Chief Financial Officer, executive and 
non-executive board members; expert evidence from actuaries and legal advisors hired by James 
Hardie as well as outside experts not involved in the reorganization. This collated material 
became available on the publication of the Jackson Inquiry Report (Jackson, 2004) and provides 
the opportunity to interrogate deliberations that would normally remain private. 
 
 
James Hardie Industries 
NV (JHI NV) 
James Hardie 
Australia 
(JHA) 
Operating Business 
 
ABN60 
Foundation 
JHIL 
(now ABN60) 
Medical Research and 
Compensation Foundation 
(MRCF)  
James Hardie &Coy. 
(now Amaca) 
Building products 
 
 
 
 Jsekarb Pty Ltd 
(Amaba) 
Brake products 
 
MRCF 
Investments 
Deed of Covenant, Indemnity 
and Access 
James Hardie NV 
(JHNV) 
Operating Business 
Figure 2: Reorganization of the former James Hardie Industries Ltd (JHIL) October 2003 
(Adapted from: Jackson, 2004). The companies highlighted represent the former parent company 
and asbestos subsidiaries. 
 
 
Deed of Covenant 
and Indemnity 
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3. THE INTERDISCIPLINARY SPACE- STRATEGIC BANKRUPTCY 
 
Delaney’s approach to corporate reorganizations, in particular in bankruptcy regimes , is located 
between the disciplines of corporate law and accounting and this interstitial space presents 
opportunities for research (Hviding, 2003). Disciplinary knowledge is generally held to follow a 
dominant paradigm in which social and economic phenomena are studied. Since both corporate 
law and accounting are entrenched in an economic-based paradigm, a disruption of this 
assumption requires a consideration of the corporation as a conceptual artifact or social 
phenomenon (Dine, 2006) where the rules of incorporation prescribe the processes for its birth, 
life and death and accounting representations discursively create the corporate financial reality. 
 
While more complex and contested than presented here, legal theories of the corporation are 
generally divided into two broad approaches: the concession theory, where the corporation is said 
to act as a collective and is endowed privileges by the State in return for public goods; and 
contract theory, which posits that the corporation is merely a nexus of contracts (Dine, 2006; 
Napier, 1998). The latter view is dominant and serves to limit the concepts of law and justice to a 
rationality understood through economic notions of market efficiency (Edelman, 2004). From 
this perspective, corporate law acts as a set of standardized rules to reduce contracting costs 
between various parties to promote market efficiency and influence individual (efficient) 
behavior (Delaney, 1994; Dine, 2006; Napier, 1998). This limited view of the corporation 
prioritizes market rationality and reinforces the notion that corporate form is ‘dispassionate’. 
Corporate law acts to preserve distributive justice; for example, asset-allocation arrangements 
and creditor rights in times of corporate financial distress.  Consequently, notions of compassion 
or rights to a moral claim are relegated to an arena of tort law (Spender, 2005, p. 280) where 
corrective justice is the objective. Therefore Delaney’s critical sociological perspective allows 
alternate insights as it does not assume “that economic activity, whether market driven or 
manager driven, is fair, rational or socially beneficial” (Eckstein and Delaney, 1993, p. 305) but 
rather considers the social ramifications of corporate strategy. 
 
Delaney (1989, 1992) initially examined the Manville Corporation; a US asbestos manufacturing 
company that employed the provisions available under Chapter XI15 of the US Bankruptcy Code 
to allocate a specific and limited pool of funds to satisfy asbestos product liability claims despite 
being ‘solvent’ at the time. For companies exposed to asbestos litigation claims, the laws 
governing the conduct of corporations provide more certainty than other legal arenas. For 
example, in the US a special set of bankruptcy provisions, referred to as ‘the Manville 
Provisions’ (s524(g)), facilitate the reorganization of companies with substantial exposure to 
asbestos liabilities. Under these provisions, funding is negotiated and a trust established to 
provide compensation calculated to fund  both present and future claims (White, 2002); however 
as: 
 
bankruptcy has become routine for asbestos firms, their managers have 
become skilled either at transferring valuable assets out of the firm before 
it files for bankruptcy or at negotiating more favorable terms for the 
funding of compensation trusts (White, 2002, p. 7). 
 
While Delaney’s empirical material focused on corporate maneuvers in a US Chapter XI style 
bankruptcy regime this study extends the idea of strategic bankruptcy by exploring a socio-
political context where the options available to management are different. In Australia, equity 
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insolvency and debtor-in-possession bankruptcies are not a part of the corporate landscape. 
Instead, the case presented here explores the establishment of a legally-separated business unit of 
limited potential as a parallel mapping of the premise of strategic bankruptcy to an alternate 
jurisdiction. In doing so, we highlight the ability of corporate management to exert their power 
and influence as a “middle-range action” where historical events and the institutional and 
political environment provide strategic options (Delaney 1989, p. 645). Table 1 demonstrates this 
parallel mapping of the targets of organizational strategy employed in a ‘strategic bankruptcy’ 
available under US Chapter XI style bankruptcy and the Australian legal regime. 
 
Table 1: Parallel Mapping of Organisational Goals in ‘Strategic Bankruptcy (Adapted from 
Delaney 1994) 
 
 
Target of 
Organizational 
Strategy 
Organizational Goal: 
Employ Chapter X1 
Organizational Goal: 
Quarantine Asbestos Liabilities 
Defining Bankrupt Unit Narrow definition/include weak 
units 
Create special purpose entity 
(MRCF) and consume liability-
laden subsidiaries. 
  
Assets/Liabilities Minimize Assets/Enhance 
Liabilities 
Manage assets to exceed 
liabilities  
 
Future Liabilities Estimate and include on the 
balance sheet 
Estimate and include on the 
balance sheet 
 
Movement of Assets 
 
Shift assets Shift assets 
 
Valuation Strategies Unfavourable valuation 
strategies/methodologies 
Strategic valuation 
strategies/methodologies 
Stakeholder strategies Communication to attenuate 
stakeholder ‘noise’ 
Communication to attenuate 
stakeholder ‘noise’ 
 
 
As with the cases studied by Delaney (1992), the organizational goal of reorganization to 
quarantine asbestos liabilities was shifted into the arena of corporate law. This arena provides 
both “a strategic opportunity to alter relationships in a corporate network drastically” and a 
“structured setting for mobilizing the legal process to transform troublesome ‘corporate life-
threatening’ relationships into more stable controllable ones” (Delaney, 1989, p. 661) thereby 
shifting “future financial risk to other, more vulnerable parties” (Delaney, 1992, p. 162). 
 
However, corporate reorganizations are enacted on a stage broader than the legal environment 
and, 
[s]trategic actors cannot simply produce a discourse to suit their 
immediate needs and, instead, must locate their discursive activities 
within a meaningful context if they are to shape and construct action…If 
we want to explain how discourses operate, we must examine the broader 
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context in order to ascertain the scope it provides for action, as well as the 
limits it places on action (Hardy et al., 2000, p.1228). 
 
The embedding of accounting discourse and meaning within the context of corporate law occurs 
in a socio-political environment that shapes the contours of actions available to management 
(Delaney, 1992) where 
[a]ctors do not behave or decide as atoms outside a social context, nor do 
they adhere slavishly to a script written for them by a particular 
intersection of social categories that they happen to occupy. Their 
attempts at purposive action are instead embedded in concrete, ongoing 
systems of social relations (Granovetter, 1985, p. 487). 
 
Strategic bankruptcy is concerned with the construction of the bottom line and how this is 
enacted or made possible through the use of ‘intraorganizational’ or internal resources and 
‘interorganizational’ networks in the context of market or external exigencies (Delaney, 1994). 
Since organizations chart their own unique course through a sea of potential resources, networks 
and adversaries (Delaney, 1994), the following section foregrounds accounting as a key factor in 
shaping the contours of Project Green. 
 
 
4. THE CONTOURS OF CORPORATE STRATEGY 
 
The establishment of the MRCF provides an opportunity to study the micro-level construction of 
a bottom line (assets and liabilities). The analytical categories developed in Table 1 are extended 
to consider the relative power of various stakeholders and institutions (outlined in Table 2). This 
framework is used to explore corporate power such as knowledge, experience, legal, financial 
and public relations resources; and interorganizational power such as relationships with creditors, 
legal and accounting experts, as well as potential adversaries in the case of James Hardie. 
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Table 2: Factors shaping James Hardie strategy (Adapted from Delaney, 1994) 
 
 
 
 
 
In addition to the vagaries of tax regimes and listing requirements in the US, Project Green was 
expected to provide a ‘comprehensive solution’ to a range of factors eroding ‘shareholder value’ . 
These factors included: the increasing quantum of claims; the failure of the insurance company to 
contribute fully to the satisfaction of claims; and, the impending changes to domestic accounting 
rules. While James Hardie was able to draw on considerable intraorganizational resources they 
were reliant on external institutions and mindful of the potential for stakeholder noise to disrupt 
Project Green. The following analysis focuses on James Hardie’s ability to shift organizational 
boundaries and control the accounting representations of assets and liabilities within the context 
of the interorganizational networks and potential adversaries. 
 
Create a Special Purpose Entity  
 
The defining boundaries of the separate legal entity are enshrined in corporate law, however what 
constitutes a corporate entity is often disputable and able to be manipulated to pursue important 
or multinational organizational goals. Delaney (1994, p.505) argues that “whomever has the 
power to determine what social grouping is defined as the “bankrupt unit” exercises significant 
control over the bottom line”. Assets and liabilities, representing future economic benefits and 
sacrifices communicate ‘net wealth’ and accounting information facilitates and legitimates 
corporate reorganization strategies by ascribing economic value to objects, artifacts and 
economic transactions, presented as “objective and unproblematic without consideration of the 
nuances and subjectivities of the [accounting] rules” (Moerman and van der Laan, 2007, p. 364). 
Quarantine Asbestos 
Liabilities (from Table 1) 
Intraorganizational Factors Interorganizational (Network) 
Factors 
Create special purpose entity 
(MRCF) and consume 
liability-laden subsidiaries. 
  
Shift organizational 
boundaries and the ‘corporate 
veil’ 
Corporations Law 
State and federal governments 
Manage assets to exceed 
liabilities  
 
Official Liabilities 
Valuable assets 
Relationship with insurance 
companies, actuaries, legal and 
accounting experts 
 
Estimate and include liabilities 
on the balance sheets 
 
Professional judgment Accounting Standards 
Accounting experts 
 
Shift assets 
 
Former subsidiaries Accounting rules  
 
Strategic valuation 
strategies/methodologies 
Calculative practices 
Cash flow modeling 
 
Relationship with actuaries 
and accounting experts   
 
Communication to attenuate 
stakeholder ‘noise’ 
Rhetoric of shareholder value 
and communication media 
Current and future claimants 
Relationship with trade unions 
State government   
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Since these rules are made within the socio-political context of standard setting, the elements of 
financial reports are, therefore, socially constructed and legally sanctioned (Morgan, 1988) and 
corporations have the opportunity to ‘tell their story’ and operationalize strategy through an 
ability to  define both the legal and financial boundaries of responsibility. 
 
While corporate law provides the skeleton, codifying the rights and obligations of the entity and 
defining the boundary of legal responsibility, it is accounting representations and the meanings 
embedded in terms such as asset and liability in specific contexts that breathe economic life into 
an entity and legitimate ‘rational’ strategic action. The MRCF initially presented a  ‘technically' 
solvent16 balance sheet conveying a limited, but adequate, ability to satisfy current and future 
asbestos claims. However, by 2003, with the cancellation of the partly-paid shares and changes to 
the accounting standards for the recognition and measurement of long-tail liabilities, the 
inadequacies of funding and the tenuous solvency status of the MRCF became obvious (Jackson, 
2004). 
 
Manage Assets  
 
Quantifiable constructs of both valuable assets and official liabilities played a pivotal role in the 
creation of the MRCF’s balance sheet. The media release announcing the establishment of the 
MRCF, directs stakeholders to a pool of “substantial assets for the benefit of claimants” (JHIL, 
2001b), and 
[t]he $293 million assets of the [MRCF] include a portfolio of long-term  
securities, a substantial cash reserve, properties which earn rent and 
insurance policies which cover various types of claims, including all 
workers compensation claims. 
 
On closer scrutiny, two of these valuable assets were derived from the recognition of certain 
accruals. First, to effect the repositioning of Coy and Jsekarb to the MRCF, Deeds of Covenant of 
Indemnity (Deeds) were negotiated between the parent and the former subsidiaries for a 
consideration of $234.15 million (undiscounted over a period from 2001 to 2042). These Deeds 
reinforced legal separation and performed important accounting functions. Since these Deeds 
could only be executed in exchange for valuable consideration, the amount settled on the former 
subsidiaries was recognized as an asset on the MRCF’s balance sheet. The Deeds also 
indemnified the parent company, James Hardie Industries Limited (JHIL) not for only asbestos 
liabilities, but for “questionable” inter-company transactions such as dividends, management fees 
and distributions (Jackson, 2004, p. 331) that occurred in the lead up to separation.  
 
Second, James Hardie’s long-standing product and public liability insurer, QBE Insurance (QBE) 
negotiated a settlement in 2000.  Previously, in 1977 QBE had cancelled its policies with James 
Hardie, citing failure to disclose information regarding the risks of asbestos exposure. A 
protracted court battle ensued and after several attempts to resolve the issue an amount of $47 
million payable in 14 annual instalments to the subsidiary, Coy (Jackson, 2004). Therefore, the 
assets of Coy and Jsekarb available to the MRCF largely comprised receivables due from other 
James Hardie entities including amounts arising from: real estate leases; loans; any future amount 
receivable under the Deed of Covenant and Indemnity with the former parent; and, future 
instalments from the settlement with their former insurer, QBE. While these assets totaled $293 
million, the amount of cash and cash equivalents available to fund asbestos claims was a mere 
$47.9 million (Jackson, 2004).  
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Estimate Liabilities 
Accounting disclosures are often used to legitimate something that is “valued and vague” or 
where there is a “need to convey some value to a third party” (Delaney, 1994, p.512).  In the 
process of legitimating the ‘valued and vague’, expertise in the form of ‘judgments’ from a range 
of professionals is co-opted. The notion of judgment is entrenched in institutional and corporate 
discourse and informs professional experts.  The role of accounting experts is highlighted in the 
valuation and disclosure of asbestos liabilities. 
 
 Prior to Project Green, Australian companies were only required to disclose known litigation 
claims. However changes to the measurement and disclosure of long-tail liabilities were mooted 
in exposure draft ED 88 Provisions and Contingencies that was released in late 1998 for public 
comment (Thomson, 2001). ED88 outlined a proposal for the recognition of a provision for those 
liabilities that were ‘probable’ and could be measured ‘reliably’. The subsequent standard, AASB 
1044 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets (issued in October 2001), 
provided the scope to bring long-tail liabilities onto the balance sheet. The impending 
promulgation of AASB 1044 was an exigent issue in the timing of the establishment of the 
MRCF. The CEO highlighted the urgency of proceeding with Project Green. 
 
Delaying creation of a Foundation past financial year end significantly 
increases the risk of ED 88 complications. Latest intelligence is that ED 
88 will be promulgated before the end of this financial year (Peter 
Macdonald, CEO, in JHIL, 2001a, p. 4). 
 
As the CEO (JHIL, 2001a, p. 4) further argued “James Hardie needs to act now” to prevent the 
negative effect of the new accounting standard on the financial statements of the Group. The 
altered recognition criteria stipulated that an accredited actuarial estimate of the present value of 
the ‘best estimate’ would suffice as a reliable measure. And, only in cases where future liabilities 
could not be reliably measured did they remain off-balance sheet as a contingent liability or 
moral obligation. James Hardie managed this process by determining ‘official’ liabilities and 
coordinating the timing of disclosure through the strategic use of expert valuations. 
 
For several years, James Hardie had employed the actuarial firm Trowbridge Consulting to 
provide in-house estimates of future asbestos liabilities17 for claims management purposes. This 
engagement included “managing Trowbridge” so they knew “which parts of the report may be 
made public” (Jackson, 2004, exhibit 61). Management maintained that these in-house estimates 
did not satisfy the accounting recognition requirements for a liability and, accordingly, James 
Hardie disclosed a contingent liability of $43 million for known or current asbestos-related claims 
in the annual report (JHIL, 2000). The following year, these in-house estimates transmogrified 
into a reliable estimate of Net Present Value18 (NPV) $286 million as the ‘most likely’ or ‘best 
estimate’ of both current and future claims (JHIL, 2001b). The previously valued but vague 
liability became an official long-tail liability that could be transferred to the MRCF through the 
strategic use of actuarial estimates. 
 
Shift Assets 
 
The use of accounting transactions to transfer or shift assets and liabilities within a corporate 
group is a common practice and the notion of ‘lifting the corporate veil’ has been a topic of 
vigorous debate in Australia, particularly in cases involving corporate group liabilities and 
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insolvent subsidiaries (Austin, 1998; Clarke and Dean, 2007; Dean and Clarke, 2005; Hill, 1995; 
Murphy, 1998; Parker, 2006; Wyatt and Mason, 1998).  
 
From the early 1990s a number of options to separate asbestos liabilities from operational 
activities had been canvassed by James Hardie management and in anticipation of a future 
corporate reorganization, the core technologies of Coy and Jsekarb had already been transferred 
to other companies within the corporate group. Further asset transfers occurred with the sale of 
plant and equipment to other subsidiaries (Jackson, 2004). These former asbestos liability laden 
subsidiaries that plagued the James Hardie group balance sheet were shifted to the new entity, the 
MRCF, and recognized as ‘assets’. 
 
Strategic Valuations 
 
Valuations, despite an air of objectivity, are subjective and ambiguous and these attributes are 
compounded in cases, such as James Hardie, where estimated long-term assets and liabilities are 
relied upon (Delaney 1989). Therefore, the power of the company to control the process of 
calculating and legitimating valuations and the reliance on expert advice is crucial (Delaney, 
1994).  
 
As with the estimates of the official liabilities, the asset values were legitimated by the advice and 
recommendations of experts, providing the economic rationale for the MRCF’s ability to ‘fund’ 
claims. 
In establishing the [MRCF], James Hardie sought expert advice from a 
number of firms, including PricewaterhouseCoopers, Access Economics 
and the actuarial firm, Trowbridge. With this advice, supplementing the 
company’s long experience in the area of asbestos, the directors of JHIL 
determined the level of funding required by the [MRCF] (JHIL, 2001b). 
 
The objectification of uncertainty and the recognition of the long-tail liability as ‘official’ in a 
single figure obfuscates the assumptions and uncertainties inherent in valuation techniques and 
models. Compounding this issue for the MRCF was the mismatch in the calculative practices. 
The actuarial estimation of liabilities used discount rates of 7% p.a. over 20 years. Subsequently, 
this actuarial estimate19 proved to be problematic (Gunz and van der Laan, 2011) for several 
reasons including the omission of recent claims data (approximately 8 months) and the truncated 
(20 year) projection for future claims. The additional data and forward projections over a longer 
period were later found to yield much higher estimates (Jackson, 2004, p. 27) rendering the 
MRCF technically insolvent from inception.  This official liabilities figure was ‘balanced’ against 
the investments held as non-current assets using a constant earnings rate of 11.7% p.a. over 50 
years20. The Jackson Inquiry found that the earnings rate was ‘selected simply to achieve the 
result that the model showed significant surpluses of funds over its life’ (Jackson, 2004, p. 9). 
Management, announcing the establishment of the MRCF and its ‘fully funded’ status, 
confidently boasted that the assets of the Foundation ($293 million) exceeded its current and 
future liabilities ($286 million) (JHIL, 2001b). James Hardie was able to draw on substantial 
intraorganizational resources including legal support, financial expert advice and media to 
confirm a fully funded and viable entity to legitimate this crucial stage of the reorganization 
strategy. The power to determine the timing of both the asset transfers and the disclosure of a 
vague contingency for asbestos liabilities as an official liability “recognized by key economic and 
political institutions” (Delaney, 1994, p.504) was reinforced by interorganizational relationships 
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and networks with valuation and accounting experts and managed through communication 
strategies. 
 
Communication and Stakeholder Noise 
 
Delaney (1989, 1994) considers that the strength of adversaries constrains corporate action. 
James Hardie had anticipated obstacles to the reorganization strategy in general and to the 
creation of the MRCF in particular; 
A significantly worse than expected reaction to the creation of the 
Foundation [MRCF] may require us to re-think the timing and some 
details of the remainder of the program…even in the face of significant 
‘noise’ about separation (Macdonald, CEO, James Hardie Industries 
Limited, 15th February, 2001a). 
 
James Hardie management documented and rated the legal, political and reputational risk of 
select adversaries that could negatively impact their strategic course which included trade unions 
and the government.  
 
The Australian industrial landscape has featured strong protection of workers’ rights through the 
trade union movement and James Hardie management assessed the risk of a ‘vocal and negative 
response’ to the creation of the MRCF by trade unions as ‘medium’ (JHIL, 2001a, p. 21).  In 
particular, trade unions have championed the ‘cause’ to protect the rights of workers and their 
entitlements in some high profile cases of corporate, or pending corporate, insolvency (Floyd, 
2005). However, with a less than 1% union shareholding via superannuation (pension) funds21 
the risk of any actual shareholder intervention in James Hardie’s affairs was not regarded as 
significant (JHIL, 2001a). Therefore, any threat of trade union instigated ‘noise’ was considered 
of little consequence.  
 
The historical development of the relationship between State22 and Commonwealth jurisdictions 
led James Hardie management to perceive the risk of government intervention to the creation of 
the MRCF as “low on legal and commercial grounds”, however not to be “ruled out on political 
grounds” (JHIL, 2001a, p.16). 
The easiest practical option for the NSW Government would be to ‘flick-
pass[23]’ the issue to the Federal Government and ask that they deal with 
it as an issue of Corporations Law (JHIL, 2001a, p. 19). 
 
The possible stakeholder ‘noise’ contributed to the speed and stealth by which the reorganization 
was effected. The ‘private and confidential’ Project Green was tabled and approved by the Board 
on the evening of February 15th 2001. The following morning, a media release, coinciding with 
the quarterly results, announced to the public the creation of the MRCF as providing ‘certainty 
for people with a legitimate claim against the former James Hardie companies which 
manufactured asbestos’ and which has ‘sufficient funds to meet all legitimate compensation 
claims anticipated’ (JHIL, 2001b).  As history has demonstrated the MRCF had no prospect of 
meeting the liabilities (Jackson, 2004) of the largest, yet least powerful group of creditors , the 
current and future claimants. Despite assessing the risk of stakeholder noise as low, the 
combination of the government, trade unions and victim support groups became a powerful 
coalition of adversaries when the financial adequacy of the MRCF was publically questioned.  
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The nature of asbestos-related disease and the consequent long-tail liability resulted in the largest 
creditor transitioning from balance sheet opacity to transparency through changes to accounting 
techniques (Moerman and van der Laan, 2013b), only to be cast adrift. While seemingly 
counterintuitive to ‘officially’ recognize James Hardie’s contingent asbestos liabilities, 
management understood the necessity to manage this complex issue through accounting 
measurement. In the aftermath of the Jackson Inquiry, the MRCF has been replaced by a new 
arrangement between James Hardie, the government and trade unions (representing asbestos 
victim support groups). In doing so, it has produced an outcome that mirrors arrangements in the 
US where corporate bankruptcy is a viable strategic option to manage corporate ‘life-threatening’ 
relationships. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Project Green, was operationalized at a time that presented strategic opportunities in the context 
of external constraints. The stated ultimate objective of Project Green was to improve shareholder 
value and position “James Hardie for future growth” (JHIL, 2001a, p. 1). In order to achieve 
these ends, the former parent company sought certainty and refuge by positioning the asbestos 
issue in an arena where the language of accounting plays a pivotal role in both negotiating 
meaning and mediating the boundaries of the economic unit and constructing the ‘bottom line’. 
The lens of strategic bankruptcy illuminates both the ex ante context and the ex post legitimation 
of strategic decision-making in an environment of scarce resources. This paper has provided an 
example at the interstitial space where law and accounting provide opportunities to further 
corporate strategy. Companies, such as James Hardie, are able to draw on significant 
intraorganisational resources to exploit these opportunities. However, strategy is not conducted in 
an organizational vacuum and strategic bankruptcy offers a critical sociological framework to 
consider the relative power of interorganizational networks and adversaries that shape its 
contours. 
 
As Delaney (1989, 1992) aptly demonstrates, corporate attempts to avoid financial responsibility 
for their activities are not new, especially in the case of a long-tail tort liability. The elimination 
of asbestos legacies by quarantining claims from operating entities raises “important questions 
about continued community acceptance of a legal doctrine which suspends the natural 
consequences of tort law in favour of companies and their shareholders to the detriment of 
involuntary tort creditors” (Dunn, 2005, p. 340). In an effort to sever “troublesome ties” and to 
avoid future financial burdens, corporate reorganizations have the potential to transfer financial 
risks to more vulnerable parties (Delaney, 1992, p. 179). Asbestos claimants entitled to corrective 
justice through tort litigation were potentially limited to receive only distributive justice from a 
business unit with limited ability to satisfy current and future claims.   
 
Accounting information has hegemonic potential through “the power relations associated with 
the allocation and control of scarce resources” (Morgan, 1988, p. 482) and the ‘implications for 
what is permissible’ (Burr, 2003, p. 5). This power is particularly salient in an environment 
where are used to “generate new meanings that help – or hinder – the enactment of particular 
strategies” (Hardy et al., 2000, p.1228). In a global environment where there is a drive to 
standardize or harmonize accounting, cases such as James Hardie highlight the vexed issue of 
sovereignty and national legal regimes that regulate corporate activities. The creation of the 
MRCF was a tailored strategic action that mobilized official liabilities in a particular legal arena 
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to achieve the same goal as other notable cases such as Manville, where claims to a strategically 
created ‘bottom line’ are invoked to manage financial risks.   
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Postscript 
The Commission of Inquiry into the establishment of the MRCF (the Jackson Inquiry) found that 
the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) was unable to assist the MRCF to manage its liabilities. 
However, on 14 July 2004 the board of James Hardie announced it would recommend to 
shareholders the approval for additional funding for the MRCF (Jackson, 2004).  Subsequently, a 
funding agreement was negotiated in 2006 where a proportion of free cash flow (under certain 
circumstances) would be made available to claimants (through a new body, the Asbestos 
Industries Compensation Fund (AICF)) (for more information see: www.ir.jameshardie.com.au). 
 
Additionally, in August 2009 JHI NV shareholders voted in favour of a resolution to re-domicile 
the company again (to Ireland) in a new form of corporate vehicle (Societas Europea) to improve 
its tax position which was not achieved through domiciling in the Netherlands. The company 
argued the move would not affect its commitment to contribute to the AICF, however it would 
likely reduce its ability to contribute in 2011 (AAP, 2009: JHI NV, 2009).  
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1
 Asbestosis was listed as the cause of death for workers in the industry as early as 1931 (Tweedale, 2000). A 
landmark study in 1964 demonstrated the link between exposure to asbestos and several types of lung cancer 
(Selikoff in Delaney, 1992) 
2
 Exposure to asbestos poses health risks ranging from asymptomatic calcified scarring of the lungs, through to 
functionally limiting conditions such as asbestosis, lung cancer and the fatal cancer of the pleural or peritoneal 
cavity, mesothelioma. 
3
 A tort is a breach of duty of care caused by an act or failure to act which causes harm for which the remedy is 
damages. A long-tail tort means thet there is a long latency period between a person’s use or exposure to a harmful 
product and the first manifestation of harm (Spender, 2003). 
4
 Asbestosis and mesothelioma are almost exclusively linked to asbestos exposure. 
5
 The most populous state in Australia. Australia has the highest per capita incidence of asbestos-related disease in 
the industrialized world (Peacock 2009; Safe Work Australia, 2009) 
6
 Renamed Amaca on 23rd February 2001. 
7
 Renamed Amaba on 20th February 2001. 
8
 A 20-F filing is the initial registration of foreign securities. 
9
 In Australia the courts have been reluctant to ‘lift the corporate veil’ (Austin, 1998) and find a parent company 
liable for the actions of a subsidiary, however significant uncertainty remains whether this will always be the case. 
10
 The Scheme of Arrangement allows for the shareholders to ‘sell’ their shares in JHIL without triggering a capital 
gains tax event. 
 See for example: 
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http://www.ir.jameshardie.com.au/jh/shareholder_services/dutch_withholding_tax/australian_tax_implications_of_2
001_restructure.jsp 
11
 James Hardie needed to secure NSW Supreme Court
11
 approval for a Scheme of Arrangement to re-domicile in the 
Netherlands. The Scheme of Arrangement was premised on certain agreements to satisfy the Court that the interests 
of stakeholders, including current and future asbestos claimants, would not be compromised. The arrangement was 
meant to ensure that the former parent, JHIL had the ability to satisfy any future asbestos-related liabilities through 
future calls on partly-paid
11
 ordinary shares. Despite assurances given to the Court by management, this was merely 
a transitional device to ensure ‘stakeholder management’ rather than a life-line for asbestos victims (Haigh, 2006, p. 
282) as evidenced by the subsequent cancellation of the shares casting claimants adrift. 
12
 Legal advice was sought by JHI NV and there was much conjecture as to the legality of the cancellation of the 
shares which effectively reduced JHIL’s share capital. The Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) provides that reductions in 
share capital are possible provided, amongst other things, the reduction ‘does not materially prejudice the company’s 
ability to pay its creditors’(s.256B(1)A). The critical issue was whether future asbestos litigants met the criteria to be 
considered creditors (Jackson, 2004). 
13
 The Deed of Covenant, Indemnity and Access was between JHI NV and JHIL (now ABN60) and covenanted that 
asbestos claims were not to be made against any JHI NV Party (any part of the group – but not the former asbestos 
subsidiaries) and indemnified each JHI NV Party  against losses arising from asbestos claims (see Jackson, 2004, 
esp. Chapter 28). 
14
 Renamed  ABN 60 on 8
th
 April 2003. 
15
 U.S. Chapter XI bankruptcy allows an out-of-court workout for firms in financial distress to restructure their debt 
and continue their operations (Chatterjee et al., 1996). 
16
 Here we use the term ‘technically’ solvent to mean reported on-balance sheet assets exceed on-balance sheet 
liabilities. 
17
 In 1996 the estimate was $230 million (Jackson, 2004, p. 589) 
18
 Based on discount rate of 7% and a time period of 20 years, net of insurance recovery. 
19
 Two of the incoming directors were former directors of entities in the James Hardie Group. 
20
 The valuation of investments was known as the ‘Twelfth Cash Flow Model’ by JHIL (Jackson, 2004)  
21
 Superannuation fund is the term given to pension funds in Australia. 
22
 The asbestos subsidiaries, Coy and Jsekarb, were incorporated in NSW and to address the large number of claims 
arising from pneumoconiosis in NSW, the State Government formed the Silicosis Board as a workers’ compensation 
body in 1927, which later became the Dust Diseases Board (DDB)
 
in 1942. With claims spiralling in NSW, to 
address non-occupational dust diseases and to relieve the increasing load on the NSW court system, the Dust 
Diseases Tribunal (DDT) was established in 1989 to expedite the processing of tort claims (DDT, 2007). 
23
 A ‘flick pass’ is a sporting term mainly used in games such as Rugby Union and Rugby League. It means a short 
sharp pass (usually behind the back) to a member of your own team resulting in a change of direction in the play or 
point of attack.  
